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abstract: This article defends Charles Peirce’s “doctrine of immediate perception.” 
This realistic view holds that conscious agents, due to the work of unconscious mind, 
directly perceive the world and often know objects, events, and persons as they truly are, 
independently of how we might prefer to think of them (what is known as our realist 
intuition). The doctrine provides a promising alternative to more recent views insisting 
that all experience of the world and other persons is ineluctably mediated by language, 
along with the categories and biases language inevitably imposes. Peirce’s view is  further 
explicated in terms of what neuroscientists now call the “new” unconscious (but to which 
Peirce contributed to earlier) and supported by recent work in both neuroscience and 
empirical psychology, especially experiments involving infants. The article supports the 
conclusion that, while much experience is mediated by language (often helpfully so), 
direct (and desirable) access to a world that informs and often surprises us persists 
throughout conscious experience.
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On July 23, 1905, Charles Peirce wrote William James, thanking him for 
papers James had sent and emphasizing his agreement with James’s 
recent publication, “La Notion de Conscience”—but “with one  exception.”1 
The exception had to do not with the content but, rather, its novelty. 
Peirce points out that William Hamilton, Thomas Reid, Kant (at least in 
his  refutation of Berkeley), and the scholastics (insofar as they followed 
 Aristotle, not  Augustine) all held the same view, namely, “the well-known 
doctrine of immediate perception” (8.261 [1905]). Peirce further writes that 
“I myself preached immediate perception as you know;—and you can’t 
find a place where I distinguish the objective and subjective side of things” 
(8.261 [1905]). As Peirce had written previously in 1901 (and now quotes 
himself in his letter to James), “When we first wake up to the fact that we 
are thinking beings . . . we have to set out upon our intellectual travels from 
the home where we already find ourselves. . . . Now this home is the parish 
of Percepts. It is not inside our skulls but out in the open. It is the external 
world that we directly perceive” (8.261 [1905]).2
That doctrine, common to Peirce and James, is now out of favor due 
to linguistic considerations, both among contemporary pragmatists and 
more broadly in philosophy and the social sciences. Consider, as a recent 
 example, Jürgen Habermas, who in Truth and Justification asks, “How can 
we reconcile the assumption that there is a world existing  independently of 
our descriptions of it and that is the same for all observers with the  linguistic 
insight that we have no direct, linguistically unmediated access to ‘brute’ 
reality?”3 This “linguistic insight,” Habermas explains, entails that “the 
reality facing our propositions is not ‘naked,’ but is itself already  permeated 
by language. The experience against which we check our assumptions is 
linguistically structured and embedded in contexts of action.”4 Habermas 
sees his own Kantian Pragmatism as a direct response to this dilemma,5 but 
there are other possibilities. Richard Rorty, for example, notoriously took 
a more radical approach: rather than reconciliation, he dropped entirely 
what he called our realist intuition, since there is no comparing descrip-
tions with reality, instead encouraging us to play different descriptions off 
one another in light of various purposes.6 Richard Bernstein, critical of 
both Rorty and Habermas, similarly forfeits Peirce’s doctrine of immediate 
 perception; he claims that pragmatism is capable of offering only a “soft” 
form of objectivity, a perspectival one that includes robust understanding 
of justification, truth, and objectivity only in relation to intersubjectivity 
(which is linguistic)—a view that will surely not satisfy the realist intuition.7
459peirce, immediate perception, and the “new” unconscious
Habermas associates the assumption that “experience is linguistically 
saturated” with the linguistic turn,8 and those referred to above are all 
associated with philosophical pragmatism; but as the psychologist Steven 
Pinker observes, something like this assumption is now broadly shared in 
the humanities and social sciences. As evidence he cites a wide range of 
authors: Roland Barthes (“Man does not exist prior to language, either as a 
species or as an individual”), Jacques Derrida (“No escape from language is 
possible”), J. Hillis Miller (“Language is not an instrument or tool in man’s 
hands, a submissive means of thinking. Language rather thinks man and 
his ‘world’ . . . if he will allow it to do so”), Nietzsche (“We have to cease to 
think if we refuse to do it in the prisonhouse of language”), and Wittgenstein 
(“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world”).9 And Benjamin 
Whorf, enormously influential in the social sciences,  notably on Kuhn (and 
thus indirectly Rorty), popularized a strong form of linguistic relativism 
that borders on linguistic determinism: “We cut nature up, organize it into 
concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are par-
ties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that holds 
throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our 
language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its 
terms are  absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by  subscribing to 
the organization and classification of data which the  agreement decrees.”10 
In this view, presumed in one  permutation or another across disciplines, 
the obligatory terms imposed by language so saturate  experience that 
access to reality, apart from its categories, appears foreclosed.  Constraint 
becomes confinement, a  “prisonhouse,” and  experience is rent from  reality. 
More troubling still, many argue that the categories imposed by speech 
communities harbor social bias and  arbitrary effects of power, such that 
 descriptions of the world both reflect and  reinscribe these damaging 
 relations. Language is, then, not just an invisible medium but an infected 
one that serves the interests of some over others, making unwitting dupes 
of even well-intentioned members of their respective speech  communities.11
Lost, of course, from this view is Peirce’s doctrine of immediate 
 perception, in which “it is the external world that we directly observe” 
(EP2, 62). This is a world forced upon us in perception, revealing its 
 characteristics and confirming them, “regardless of what you, or I, or any 
man, or generation of men, may think that they are” (EP2, 62). This is 
Peirce’s expression of the realist intuition, and in this essay I argue, with 
Peirce, that the purported insight common to Habermas and others is 
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 overstated. Unmediated access to reality is not possible—the mind is not 
a mirror—but not all experience is mediated by language, nor is all experi-
ence mediated by the specific categories a given language imports when 
learned and habitually embedded in cultural practices. This means that 
there is no need to jettison the realist intuition; what is more, we discard it 
at our peril, for, as Peirce famously wrote, “experience is our only teacher,” 
one that “invariably teaches by means of surprises” (EP2, 153, 194), and the 
possibility of genuine surprise is precisely what the realist intuition pre-
serves. To explain and defend Peirce’s doctrine of immediate perception 
I turn primarily to Peirce’s work in psychology. More specifically, I draw 
on Peirce’s theory of unconscious mind to show that much of what the 
mind accomplishes occurs rapidly and automatically, outside of conscious 
control, and below the level of explicit consciousness. At least some of this 
work, and the conscious experience to which it sometimes gives rise, is not 
mediated by language (or its categories). The implication is that, although 
much of our experience of the world is mediated by language, experience is 
broader still, providing genuine access to the world; or as Peirce would have 
it, we experience real things, persons, and events as they are, independently 
of how we (or language) would prefer to think of them.
Moreover, Peirce’s view provides more than just an attractive philo-
sophical alternative to prevailing linguistic assumptions regarding access 
to the world: it enjoys substantial support from recent neuroscience and 
empirical psychology. Peirce the practicing scientist drew on his own lab-
oratory experiments to develop a new theory of unconscious mind, the 
implications of which are only now being explored (as the “new” uncon-
scious in neuroscience); Peirce the philosopher drew on that theory of 
mind to develop a compelling account of access to the real world, which he 
terms the doctrine of immediate perception. This essay focuses on Peirce’s 
account of this doctrine and contemporary empirical evidence supporting 
the theory on which it rests.
1. Peirce and the “New” Unconscious
In 1903 Peirce wrote that “our logically controlled thoughts compose a 
small part of the mind, the mere blossom of a vast complexus which we 
may call the instinctive mind in which this man will not say that he has 
faith because that implies the conceivability of distrust, but upon which 
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he builds as the very fact to which it is the whole business of his logic to 
be true” (EP2, 241). “Instinctive mind,” Peirce claims, is largely out of our 
 control (“Some  elements we can control in some limited measure” [EP2, 
240]), and  “concerning that quite uncontrolled part of the mind, logical 
maxims have as little to do as with the growth of hair and nails” (EP2, 
240–41). The uncontrolled part consists of unconscious processes that, 
while  fallible, intelligently serve the interests of the organism. As  Leonard 
 Mlodinow observes, nearly twenty years earlier Peirce (with his student 
Joseph Jastrow) had performed “the first scientific demonstration that 
the unconscious mind possesses knowledge that escapes the conscious 
mind.”12
Peirce believed the unconscious intelligent due to Darwinian  selection: 
“The mind of man is strongly adapted to the comprehension of the world. 
. . . [C]ertain conceptions, highly important for such a comprehension, 
 naturally arise in his mind. . . . [W]ithout such a tendency, the mind could 
never have had any development at all” (W3, 318). These conceptions  provide 
“inward light . . . without which the human race would long ago have been 
extirpated for its utter incapacity in the struggles for existence.”13 Accord-
ing to Peirce, “The great utility and indispensableness of the  conceptions 
of time, space, and force, even to the lowest intelligence, are such as to 
suggest that they are the results of natural selection” (W3, 318). Peirce else-
where writes that all animals have “some virtual knowledge of space and of 
force” and that all animals like us have “some virtual comprehension of the 
minds of other animals of their kind,” making them both applied physi-
cists and applied psychists (EP2, 51; cf. 5.592, 5.603 [1903]).14 What is more, 
Peirce strikingly concludes (again on evolutionary grounds) that uncon-
scious conceptions are not merely effective or coincidentally useful but 
almost surely correct: “He [an animal] might, it is true, be provided with an 
instinct which would generally have the same effect; that is to say, he might 
have conceptions different from those of time, space, and force, but which 
coincided with them in regard to the ordinary cases of the animal’s experi-
ence. But, as that animal would have an immense advantage in the struggle 
for life whose mechanical conceptions did not break down in a novel situ-
ation (such as development must bring about), there would be a constant 
selection in favor of more and more correct ideas of these matters” (W3, 
318). Unconscious mind, in short, is an evolutionary survival  mechanism 
that, although largely out of our control, helps human beings cope intel-
ligently with a demanding, changing environment. This view is consistent 
kory sorrell 462
with—it thoroughly anticipates and to some degree  inaugurated—what is 
now called the “new” unconscious to distinguish it from ideas popularized 
by Freud.15
Peirce’s view is that consciousness does not, and cannot, control what 
it is unaware of. Conscious perception (when it arises at all) is the result of 
an already executed unconscious process that, being already in the imme-
diate past, is not subject to deliberate modification. This unconscious pro-
cess, which gives rise to a conscious current, takes the various fragmented 
inputs of the senses and constructs, or, rather, reconstructs, the environment 
causing the sensations (using instinctive knowledge or rules, “mechani-
cal conceptions” fashioned by evolution). Conscious mind is therefore 
not directly aware of its fragmentary sensations but, rather, the coherent 
“representation,” “model,” or “map” generated by unconscious mind. As 
Antonio Damasio more recently explains, “Perception, in whatever sensory 
modality, is the result of the brain’s cartographic skill.”16 “The images in 
our minds,” according to Damasio, “are the brain’s momentary maps of 
everything and anything, inside our body and around it, concrete as well 
as abstract, actual or previously recorded in memory.”17 These maps pick 
out salient patterns of objects and the world and “can be rapidly drawn, 
redrawn, and overdrawn, at the speed of lightning.”18 As Mlodinow writes, 
“Modern neuroscience teaches us that, in a way, all our perceptions must be 
considered illusions. That’s because we perceive the world only  indirectly, 
by processing and interpreting the raw data of our senses.”19
We might think that this vindicates Kant and encourages a recrudes-
cence of a two-world ontology and epistemological dualism, but the lesson, 
in light of Darwin (and Peirce), is quite different. As the neuropsycholo-
gist Chris Frith writes, “Our brains build models of the world and con-
tinuously modify these models on the basis of the signals that reach our 
senses. So, what we actually perceive are our brain’s models of the world. 
They are not the world itself, but, for us, they are as good as. You could say 
that our perceptions are fantasies that coincide with reality.”20 “Fantasy” 
coincides with reality because unconscious mind is itself in direct contact 
with the world and proceeds on a self-correcting loop. When perceiving 
an object, unconscious mind uses prior beliefs (many of which we can-
not consciously access), which constitute its accumulated models of the 
world, to predict other signals it should be receiving.21 This involves a sense 
of anticipation, and if these signals are received, the model is confirmed; 
if not, if  contradictory signals arrive, then unconscious mind rapidly 
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updates/revises its model based on these new signals, generates further 
predictions, and repeats the loop until errors indicating deviation from our 
current model are reduced to insignificance. Amazingly, this usually takes 
only a few cycles, or about one hundred milliseconds, to complete.22 That 
our models are correct, and not merely useful, is strongly suggested by the 
evolutionary reasoning Peirce sets out above: animals capable of accurate 
(and very, very fast) representation in a changing, developing environment 
would hold a decided advantage over those that were not.
It is important to note that the modeling process described by Frith, 
which depends on the continuous experience of error to construct an 
 accurate model of reality, is also thoroughly anticipated by Peirce in his 
 conception of the independently real: “The experience of ignorance, or 
of error, which we have, and which we gain by means of correcting our 
errors, or enlarging our knowledge, does enable us to experience and 
 conceive something which is independent of our own limited views” 
(W3, 32).  Accurate depiction of a reality independent of mind is possible 
through  progressive detection of error (i.e., the shock of “experience,” our 
only teacher), even though the depiction itself depends on mind. Peirce 
simultaneously recognizes that “everything which is present to us is a 
 phenomenal manifestation of ourselves” and that the presentation may 
be of a  “phenomenon of something without us” (W2, 223)—or as Peirce 
observed in 1901, “The inkstand is a real thing. Of course, in being real and 
external, it does not in the least cease to be a purely psychical product, a 
generalized percept” (EP2, 62).
The result of this understanding of unconscious mind, and its 
 intermediary relationship between consciousness and the world, is a 
 distinct form of realism. On one hand, Peirce discards Kantian distinctions 
between phenomena and noumena because models or representations of 
the world do not swing free of the world represented. Model and world 
are causally connected, and models genuinely represent portions of the 
world because they are continuously informed by the world represented 
through prediction and correction. On the other hand, representations do 
not  simply “mirror” input. For example, as Frith and Mlodinow explain 
(and Peirce observed), ocular perception includes a blind spot in each eye, 
leaving a hole in each eye’s field of vision. Unconscious mind compensates 
by filling up the empty space based on information derived from inputs 
surrounding each lacuna.23 Moreover, the human eye performs not only 
saccades (eyes bouncing around a scene to get a full “picture” of a large 
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canvas) but microsaccades—essentially a jiggling movement around the 
focus of attention. This is the fastest movement the body performs, and 
we are consciously unaware of both forms because the brain constantly 
edits out the transitional movement and fills in perception in a way that 
makes it look steady and smooth.24 The experience may be of a current or 
stream, but that is an effect, an extraordinary product of enormous (uncon-
scious) work using rules not learned through language. More important, 
the unconscious mind does not just produce a reflection or copy image of 
what it sees; it takes limited, disparate, erratic, and poor-quality sensory 
impressions and enhances them according to its own rules—rules that 
allow the mind to get an accurate representation of the world despite such 
poor inputs.25
2. Evidence from Neuroscience
Significant support for nonlinguistic, unconscious perception and reason-
ing comes from two distinct sources. One is findings in neuroscience that 
support the “new” unconscious and that at least some of its workings is not 
mediated by language or linguistic categories. The first is the phenomenon 
known as “blindsight.” As Robert Kurzban points out, this phenomenon—
which includes patients who are completely blind being able to identify sta-
tistically above chance whether a picture is an X or an O and a blind patient 
successfully navigating a hallway strewn with obstacles—suggests that one 
part of the brain (which is clearly unconscious) is receiving, recording, pro-
cessing, and under some instances passing on information not available to 
consciousness.26 This also suggests that there are in fact multiple, parallel 
pathways along which vision is processed unconsciously.27 One of these, 
known as the “Old Pathway,” proceeds through an ancient midbrain struc-
ture and is concerned with “where”: it identifies object location, orients the 
observer, and allows him or her to track it. The other is the “New Pathway,” 
which runs to a section of the brain containing cortical maps and then splits 
into two paths again. The first, which neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran 
calls Pathway 1, is concerned with the “how” of objects, that is, the rela-
tionships among objects in space. This pathway is linked closely to motor 
systems and acts very fast: “When you dodge an object hurled at you, when 
you navigate around a room avoiding bumping into things, when you step 
gingerly over a tree branch or a pit, or when you reach out to grab an object 
or fend off a blow, you are relying on the ‘how’ stream.”28
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Pathway 2 focuses on the “what” of things. It runs first through a 
region of the brain that mainly forms classifications of things  (distinctions 
between kinds of objects or persons) but does not initially attach 
 significance; further on (later in the process) memories and  associated 
facts are recruited to develop more expansive meanings, and messages are 
relayed to other parts of the brain to evoke feelings about what is seen.29 
Both pathways perform equally complex computations,  Ramachandran 
suggests, but when Pathway 2 is damaged (as in cases of blindsight) “visual 
awareness winks out,” even though Pathway 1  continues to  operate. That 
the brain is aware of spatial forms and relations but does not convey this 
information to consciousness (apparently giving rise to a sort of “feeling” 
or hunch as described above) explains how certain blind patients can still 
“see” even though not directly aware of anything in their perceptual range.
Ramachandran believes that there is yet a third unconscious path-
way, one he calls the “so what” stream. Biologically important stimuli 
(such as eyes, facial expressions, animate movement) bypass Pathway 2, 
along with its associations of significance, fact, and memory, and head 
directly to the emotional core of the brain, a shortcut enabling quick 
reactions/responses in high-value situations.30 These again give rise 
to important feelings and reactions not mediated by classification and 
memory. The philosophical significance of tracking these psychological 
processes is thus twofold: on one hand, it supports our commonsense 
intuition that some, perhaps much, of our experience of the world is 
veridical. Even if we do not have direct access to the world, the model 
we perceive is often accurate—that is, as Peirce insists, we experience 
aspects of the world as it is, independently of how we may prefer to think 
of it. On the other hand, these processes indicate that some, perhaps 
much, of our experience is not mediated by language or the categories 
it imports, though it may later come to be so (without necessarily losing 
what came before it).
Moreover, assuming that something like Ramachandran’s  description 
is correct, the identification of multiple perceptual pathways casts new light 
on (and I suggest further supports something approximating) Peirce’s own 
distinctions among percepts, perceptual judgment, and the percipuum 
(Peirce’s term for experience that includes both percept and  perceptual 
judgment). The issues are complex, in part because Peirce scholars  disagree 
regarding the precise meaning of Peirce’s terms and in part because the 
domains of different neural pathways are still  uncertain.31  Nevertheless, 
Peirce’s distinctions, which are rooted in meticulous  observation of 
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 everyday experience, appear to reflect (if imperfectly)  phenomenal 
 differences made manifest by differences in perceptual pathways recently 
identified in  neuroscientific research. According to Peirce, “Every percept is 
the product of mental processes, or at all events of processes for all intents 
and  purposes mental, except that we are not directly aware of them; and 
these are processes of no little complexity” (7.624 [1903]). Percepts are 
composed of positive qualities, such as color and shape, and connections 
among them, and these are directly perceived in a single, undivided whole 
(7.625 [1903]). This would seem to reflect something like the experience of 
perception identified by Ramachandran as the Old Pathway, Pathway 1, and 
Pathway 3.
Perceptual judgment, however, goes beyond percepts and is entirely 
unlike a percept, according to Peirce: “Given a percept, this percept does 
not describe itself; for description involves analysis, while the percept 
is whole and undivided. But once having a percept, I may contemplate 
it, and say to myself, ‘That appears to be a yellow chair’; and our usual 
language is that we ‘perceive’ it to be a yellow chair, although this is 
not a percept, but a judgment about a present percept” (7.626 [1903]). 
Like  percepts, perceptual judgments force themselves on us. We can 
no more willfully decide that what appears yellow is not than we can 
 willfully decide that what looks like a chair does not: “If one sees, one 
 cannot avoid the  percept; and if one looks, one cannot avoid the percep-
tual  judgment” (7.627 [1903]). The “great overshadowing difference” 
between the two is that  perceptual  judgments profess to represent some-
thing: “In a  perceptual judgment the mind professes to tell the mind’s 
future self what the  character of the  present percept is” (7.630 [1903]). 
Perceptual  judgments  generalize,  classify, and identify what kind of thing 
a  percept is. If  Ramachandran is correct, then the phenomenal experience 
of  perceptual judgment  identified by Peirce would seem to reflect activity 
that occurs  predominantly along Pathway 2.
Peirce defines the percipuum as “the percept as it is immediately 
 interpreted in the perceptual judgment” (7.643 [1903]). Regarding the 
 percept alone, we know nothing about it except “that we feel the blow of 
it, the reaction of it against us, and we see the contents of it arranged into 
an object, in its totality. . . . But the moment we fix our minds upon it 
and think the least thing about the percept, it is the perceptual judgment 
that tells us what we so ‘perceive’” (7.643 [1903]). Together these form the 
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percipuum: it “is what forces itself upon your acknowledgement, without 
any why or wherefore, so that if anybody asks you why you should regard 
it as  appearing so and so, all you can say is, ‘I can’t help it. That is how 
I see it’” (7.643 [1903]). The percipuum is what we perceive, the percept as 
interpreted, and it appears that both percept and perceptual judgment are 
constituent of the percipuum.
Peirce’s description of the percipuum—or something approximating 
it, though Peirce’s concept may require further consideration in light of 
recent (and future) developments—is what we should expect in terms of 
perceptual experience when perception not only is processed along  different 
pathways (Old Pathway, New Pathways 1, 2, 3) but is simultaneously pro-
cessed differently, with the results of each entering conscious experience. 
Because unconscious mind performs multiple tasks at once, we are able to 
experience both percept and perceptual judgment. Or perhaps more accu-
rately, we are able to shift back and forth, more or less across a spectrum 
between extremes: we can predominantly see a white, hard object with red 
laces; then see it distinctly as a baseball; then contemplate it as significant 
of poignant childhood memories; and then revert endlessly through any 
of the other forms of perception, perhaps vaguely experiencing multiple 
forms simultaneously in transition.
The essential point is not that all perceptual experience must be either 
linguistically mediated or determined by innate categories (a strict and 
overly simple dichotomy) but that perceptual experience of even a  seemingly 
 simple object (a baseball) may seamlessly range across a  continuum that 
draws on different sorts of categories, in different degrees. At one extreme lie 
categories deeply embedded by Darwinian evolution that accurately  capture 
certain critical features of the world—such as  spatial  relations, move-
ment, loud noises, and facial expression; at the other lie highly  mediated 
 categories borne by linguistic habits and  practices (such as the game of 
baseball). Other categories, ones that involve native  predisposition but are 
subject to cultural elaboration or refinement  (influenced by  language or 
otherwise), lie in between the two.32 The pressing question is not whether 
experience is mediated but how, by what sorts of categories (linguistic or 
otherwise), to what extent, and to what effect—without  jettisoning our 
 realist intuition that we can and often do know features of the world, as 
it is, “regardless of what you, or I, or any man, or generation of men, may 
think that they are” (EP2, 62).
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3. Evidence from Empirical Psychology
The second source of evidence supporting nonlinguistic, real access to 
the world comes from recent studies of infants, of those literally not yet 
capable of speech and (presumably) not yet having absorbed the categories 
 embedded therein. The fact that what we once considered adult or at least 
developed behavior already appears prior to language, besides overturn-
ing much of what was previously thought about infants, further supports 
the view that not all experience is mediated or “saturated” by linguistic 
 categories.
Babies are notoriously difficult to study—far more than pigeons or 
rats—but scientists have developed new methods. Babies cannot talk, but 
one behavior is telling and can be influenced by researchers: eye movement. 
Simply how long a baby looks at something conveys information about his 
or her understanding. As Paul Bloom explains, “One specific looking-time 
method is habituation. Like adults, if babies see the same thing over and 
over again, they’ll get bored and look away. Boredom—or ‘habituation’—is 
a response to sameness, so this method reveals what babies see as similar 
and as different.”33 Looking-time studies can also be used to study babies’ 
expectations: when events occur as expected, babies are bored and look for 
something else, but if expectations are not met, babies express surprise 
by looking carefully at the objects in the scene.  Researchers have used the 
method to demonstrate that babies have a basic understanding of physics, 
and Bloom concludes that “a vast body of research now suggests that—
contrary to what legions of psychology  undergraduates were taught for 
decades—babies think of objects largely as adults do, as  connected masses 
that move as units, that are solid and subject to  gravity, and that move in 
 continuous paths through space and time.”34 Just as Peirce  suggested, we are 
by nature virtual physicists. It also appears that babies do not just observe; 
they actively experiment. According to Alison Gopnik,  three-month-olds 
prefer objects they can influence and react more strongly to them: “Babies 
prefer to look at the mobile that they can influence themselves, and they 
smile and coo at it more. This suggests that it isn’t just that they like the 
effect—they really are trying to make the effect happen and to see the con-
sequences. They are happy because the experiment succeeds.”35 Babies 
do not just have a basic understanding of physics but actively engage the 
world and learn from their efforts—by surprise, of course—long before 
they begin to speak or use the categories of language.
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Studies also show that babies are born able to discriminate human faces 
and sounds from other objects and noises.36 What is more, babies actively 
engage people in meaningful behavior by imitation. Andrew  Meltzoff 
 performed experiments on newborns to determine how early babies imitate 
adult expressions. He started with three-week-olds but eventually attended 
delivery rooms to experiment with even younger subjects. The youngest 
was forty-two minutes old and also imitated expressions. Basic imitation—
such as a baby sticking out his or her tongue in response to an adult doing 
the same—may seem simple (a case of stimulus/response even) but is 
in fact rather complex. Babies have not seen their own faces, much less 
their tongues, and yet are able to coordinate what they see with their own 
bodily sensations (proprioception) to produce a similar expression. What 
is more, babies do not just imitate—they flirt. Babies spontaneously time 
their responses, staying still in observing adults babbling and cooing at 
them and then kicking and babbling in return when adults stop, establish-
ing a synchronized connection: “Like grown-up flirtation, baby flirtation 
bypasses language and establishes a more direct link between people.”37
Still more complex, intelligent behavior may be found in recent  studies 
by Bloom that indicate that babies are capable of not only  recognizing agency 
but making judgments about agents’ behavior (or as Peirce  suggested, are 
virtual psychists). Bloom and colleagues constructed scenarios in which 
an “agent” (a red ball) was seen struggling up a hill. In some instances, 
a  yellow square appeared and “helped” the red ball up; in others, a green 
triangle appeared and pushed the ball backward. In a variation, a puppet 
struggled to open a lid on a box. In some cases, another puppet would 
appear and help, while in others it would appear and jump on the lid, 
 slamming it shut. In these experiments, three-month-olds clearly preferred 
to look at the helpers; older babies, capable of more motor control, not only 
look to helpers but reach out for them.38
Bloom draws on these studies to suggest that babies are born with 
a moral sense, a rudimentary capacity to judge agents’ behavior. This is 
an open question, but it at least indicates that, prior to an infant develop-
ing and using language, he or she already recognizes agency in the world 
and discriminates among different kinds of behavior (help/harm). This of 
course does not suggest that capacities already formed in infants are not 
modified and refined by habits embedded in linguistic (and other cultural) 
practices with which a baby develops and grows up. They surely are, as the 
child comes to discriminate, for example, between harmful aggression and 
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necessary discipline. But there is similarly no reason to believe that these 
forms of cognitive behavior, early expressed unconsciously, subsequently 
occur only in or through language (a proposition for which we would need 
considerable evidence). On the contrary, they remain constitutive of the 
vast unconscious Peirce identified and on which Peirce insisted we rely for 
much of our mental lives and practical engagement with the world.
4. Conclusion
The last two sections offer empirical evidence supporting the view that not 
all experience is mediated by language or the categories of thought imported 
thereby. The work of unconscious mind—which not only provides basic 
understanding of the world but also continually models it veridically and, 
where agents are concerned, evaluates it—proceeds rapidly, automatically, 
and at least to some extent according to rules endowed by evolution (or 
at least developed very early and prior to language). It is no less certain 
that as we mature experience is also mediated to some extent, and in some 
cases extensively, by language. And as Pinker writes, “Of all the faculties 
that go into the piece of work called man, language may be the most awe-
inspiring.”39 Language does not just convey information, facilitate memory, 
underwrite explicit reasoning, and reveal hidden connections via metaphor 
and metonym—which is impressive enough; it cultivates (as John Dewey 
well understood) sharing, participation, and genuine community.
But the grandeur of language does not require the belief that “all 
experience is saturated by language”; indeed, as Pinker writes, “the idea 
that language is a prisonhouse denigrates its subject by overestimating its 
power.”40 As Peirce rightfully insisted, there is more to experience than 
language. There is a real world that intrudes on our senses and that we 
come to know gradually, through surprise and deliberate trial and error, 
in all its splendor and variety, and which we struggle to capture, explore, 
transform, and communicate to one another through language. If anything 
is more wonderful than language itself, it is that we have both—language 
and world—and while we may at times need to distinguish one from the 
other for various practical purposes, we do not have to choose between—
or somehow reconcile—the two. The task, rather, is to learn how we are 
informed by each and, better yet, how we can improve our shared practices 
involving both together.
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